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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, National Warranty Risk Retention Group, a Nebraska-
based insurance company, transferred all of its assets to the Cayman
Islands and filed for bankruptcy there.' In order to enjoin a potential
class action lawsuit in the United States, the company then filed an
ancillary petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Nebraska asking
the court to grant comity to its Cayman Islands proceeding. 2 The
bankruptcy court complied and enjoined the litigation, invoking Sec-
tion 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, forcing the U.S. plaintiffs to
bring their claims in the Caymans.3 As a result, despite being based
in the United States and conducting no business in the Caymans, Na-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Kauffman Legal Fellow, Harvard Law School. J.D. 2008, Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank the following people for providing feedback on earlier
drafts: Ethan Bernstein, Dan Glosband, Ted Janger, Christopher Jarvinen, Lynn
LoPucki, John Pottow, Tejinder Singh, and Elizabeth Warren.





tional Warranty4 had the best of both worlds-it received the powerful
protection of U.S. bankruptcy law while it forced those who wanted to
file claims against it into the Caymans legal system.5
Since National Warranty, Congress has replaced Section 304 with
Chapter 15 as part of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act.6 Experts had complained about the ability
of companies to conduct the bankruptcies of U.S.-based businesses
through offshore havens. 7 According to some, Chapter 15 would put
an end to this practice.8 This new law requires the debtor to have a
sufficient nexus with the foreign bankruptcy venue in order to have
access to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's protections. Chapter 15 states
that courts must grant assistance to foreign bankruptcies located
where the debtor has its "center of main interests" (or COMI) and may
grant assistance to proceedings where the debtor carries on "nontran-
sitory economic activity."9 Some have argued this nexus requirement
would put an end to National Warranty type cases.1 0 No longer would
U.S. debtors be able to conduct their bankruptcies through haven
proceedings. 1 '
Others have argued that Chapter 15 and its COMI standard would
be ineffective at restricting forum shopping. 12 They have argued that
4. In re Nat'l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group, 300 B.R. 719 (Bankr. Neb. 2003),
affd, 384 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2004) ("National Warranty has done all of its busi-
ness in the United States since the day it was created. Until late May 2003,
when it transferred approximately $24,000,000 to banks in the Cayman Islands,
all of its financial and hard assets were located in the United States, mainly in
Lincoln, Nebraska. All of the entities for which it provided insurance, its mem-
bers, are located in the United States. All of the Vehicle Service Contracts which
it administers and for which it has provided insurance to its members, were en-
tered into in the United States and are subject to the laws of the various states.").
5. In re Nat'l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group, 384 F.3d at 963.
6. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 11 of the
United States Code).
7. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bank-
ruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2240-41 (1999-2000).
8. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 727 (2005);
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2276, 2317 (1999-2000) ("A naked incorporation in a sun-drenched bank
haven would fall easily before proof of the actual center of the business, while a
multiply-centered business incorporated under the law of any of its centers would
be easily 'centered' for bankruptcy purposes.").
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (2006) (mandating courts to recognize foreign bankruptcy
proceedings filed in the debtor's center of main interests); 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006)
(listing the consequences of recognition).
10. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 8, at 728 ("[T]he COMI of a company
like National Warranty would be clearly located in Nebraska and thus the Cay-
mans liquidation could not be its main proceeding.").
11. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, supra note 8, at 2317.
12. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 89-90
(2005) (describing how the COMI rule opens the door to forum shopping). See
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there is an enormous incentive for debtors to strategically select their
bankruptcy forum and Chapter 15's COMI standard would be incapa-
ble of restraining debtors from forum shopping.13 Because COMI is
undefined-and perhaps even incapable of definition-debtors would
be able to file for bankruptcy in a foreign jurisdiction and then file an
ancillary petition in the United States seeking cooperation with that
foreign court. Not only does this give debtors the ability to choose
their preferred bankruptcy laws, but it also potentially provides an
incentive for some countries to adapt their bankruptcy laws in order to
attract large multinational cases-thus promoting a race to the bot-
tom, with the probable competitors in this race being tax haven
jurisdictions.14
The study reported in this Article contributes to this debate by fo-
cusing on the empirical question of whether Chapter 15 has indeed
restricted forum shopping into haven jurisdictions. This question is
significant to the evaluation of Chapter 15 for two reasons, both re-
lated to the fact that most haven-related companies conduct no busi-
ness at all in the haven jurisdiction. First, Chapter 15's COMI
standard has been predicted to require more of a nexus than mere
incorporation. Consequently, very seldom should a court find that a
debtor's COMI is in a haven. Second, if Chapter 15 is indeed promot-
ing a race to the bottom regarding bankruptcy laws, havens are likely
to be among the winners of this race. While haven jurisdictions have
an incentive to pass strong creditor protections in order to make ha-
ven-registered companies attractive to investors, they have little in-
centive to protect employees, trade creditors, and other interests
impacted by business failures. Thus, these jurisdictions are likely
candidates to adapt their bankruptcy laws to attract multinational
corporate debtors.
To measure Chapter 15's impact on haven bankruptcy filings, this
study examines every ancillary petition filed during Chapter 15's first
three years as well as every Section 304 filing during the three years
prior to the change in law. It asks two questions: (1) are debtors, en-
also John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward
Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 89, 125 (2006)
("[S]upporters also tend to ignore the significant financial incentives for strategic
case placement, and the motivations driving law firms to place the case in their
local court.").
13. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Univer-
salist Approach, CORNELL L. REV. 696, 760 (1998-99) ("Courts too easily manipu-
late vague standards such as the 'center of its interests' or the 'center of gravity'
when the future of local businesses, the priorities of local creditors, and millions
of dollars in professional fees hang in the balance.").
14. LoPucki, supra note 7, at 2237 ("Havens such as the Cayman Islands and Ber-
muda will be driven by competition to adopt laws that seek to systematically ex-




couraged by the vague COMI test, re-incorporating into haven juris-
dictions as part of their bankruptcy planning? and (2) has the number
of cases shopped into havens changed since the enactment of Chapter
15? This Article reports that there is no evidence of debtors re-incor-
porating into haven jurisdictions as part of their bankruptcy planning.
In addition, it reports that since the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to grant comity to a Cayman
Islands bankruptcy in the highly-visible In re Bear Stearns proceed-
ings,15 the number of haven petitions has dropped dramatically. Only
one was subsequently filed, and that debtor actually had its office and
operations in the havens.
From this data, this Article concludes that Chapter 15 has re-
stricted the ability of debtors to forum shop into haven bankruptcy
courts and then seek cooperation in the United States. It is possible
that debtors will adjust to this new legal regime and find ways to shop
into their preferred venues. As Chapter 15's opponents correctly point
out, the incentives to do this are very high. Although there is no evi-
dence that debtors are moving into havens as part of their bankruptcy
planning, it may still be too early to detect this behavior. And it is
also possible that debtors will be able to obtain U.S. cooperation as
"nonmain" proceedings without the need to prove their COMI is in a
haven jurisdiction. However, the data thus far indicates that courts
have interpreted Chapter 15's COMI test to effectively monitor forum
shopping attempts into haven countries.
This Article begins with a brief description of international bank-
ruptcy forum shopping. This initial section discusses the two princi-
pal models for conducting transnational insolvencies and explains how
forum shopping can be accomplished under each. It then discusses the
problems forum shopping creates, particularly in relation to haven ju-
risdictions. And finally it examines forum shopping from an American
perspective and distinguishes between two general types of forum
shopping: "inbound" and "outbound."
Part III discusses the sections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code aimed
at dealing with the problem of "outbound" forum shopping, first under
Section 304 and then under Chapter 15. It also outlines the debate
regarding the impact the new law would have on "outbound forum
shopping."
Part IV reviews the development of Chapter 15 by highlighting
three major decisions: In re Tri-Continental, 16 In re SPhinX, 17 and In
re Bear Stearns.i8 Parts V and VI present the data collection method-
15. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structure Credit Strategies Master Fund, 374
B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
16. 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
17. 351 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
18. 374 B.R. at 124.
[Vol. 88:317
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ology and the findings concerning the impact the law has had on "out-
bound" forum shopping: although forum shopping into offshore havens
accounted for nearly a third of all filings under Section 304 and Chap-
ter 15, such forum shopping came to an abrupt halt after the court's
decision in In re Bear Stearns. Part VII argues that this data signals
the end of outbound forum shopping and discusses the importance of
this conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. International Bankruptcy Forum Shopping
A debtor company can internationally forum shop its bankruptcy
filing when it has the ability to select a country in which to file for
bankruptcy protection and, consequently, which country's bankruptcy
laws will govern its worldwide assets. 19 To understand how this
might be accomplished and why it matters, this section first describes
the two principal models for transnational bankruptcy law-territori-
alism and universalism. 20 It then presents some of the harms created
by forum shopping. And finally, it examines forum shopping from an
American perspective, differentiating between cases that are shopped
into the United States and those that are shopped out of the United
States.
Territorialism and universalism describe two approaches for han-
dling cross-border insolvencies. Under territorialism, an insolvent
multinational company 21 files for bankruptcy in every country in
which its assets are located. 22 Each bankruptcy court then applies its
19. See infra text accompanying note 27. Although choice of venue and choice of law
are two separate questions in theory, in practice courts apply their own bank-
ruptcy laws. Id.
20. Professor Robert K. Rasmussen has offered a third model, contractualism, in
Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2252 (2000). A discussion of this model, however, is outside the scope of this
Article.
21. This Article uses the word "multinational company" to mean a business entity
whose place of incorporation, assets, operations, headquarters, and employees
are not all in the same country. This includes a company that is incorporated in
X and has its assets in Y.
22. John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A
Lesson from Maritime Law, 17 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 253, 262 (2006-07)
("Territorialism is simply the traditional practice of nations exercising exclusive
jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders: 'It is the default rule in
every substantive area of law, including . . .bankruptcy.' It rests upon tradi-
tional notions of national sovereignty, which means that the law of the sovereign
is imposed on all people and property within its territorial reach. In a transna-
tional bankruptcy conducted under the principles of territorialism, each country
decides under its own laws how the debtor's assets within its territory will be
treated in the face of creditor claims, without deferring to any foreign proceeding
involving the same debtor.").
2009]
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own local bankruptcy law to the assets within its borders, thus provid-
ing a simple rule for both the choice of forum and the choice of law.23
Universalism, in contrast, envisions one bankruptcy court applying
one law worldwide. 24 Because there is currently no such international
bankruptcy court or law, universalists advocate a more pragmatic ap-
proach, known as "modified universalism," that approximates their
theoretical ideal. 25 Under this approach, the multinational debtor
files one "main" bankruptcy proceeding in its home country and then
files "ancillary" petitions in the other jurisdictions, asking those courts
to cooperate with the main proceeding. 26 While modified universal-
ism technically provides only a choice of forum rule-which proceed-
ing should be considered "main"-it effectively works as a choice of
law rule as well because that main proceeding will likely apply its own
laws to the proceeding.27
23. Id.
24. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. 625, 625-26 (2005) ("However, the modern approach is 'universalism.' In its
ideal form, universalism envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor's
'home country.' A single court would make a unified worldwide distribution to
creditors through liquidation or reorganization.").
25. Id. at 626.
26. Id. ("Because a pure form of universalism is not immediately achievable, many
universalists have adopted 'modified universalism,' in which the courts seek a
result in multinational cases as close as possible to a unified worldwide adminis-
tration and distribution."). See Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational
Default, supra note 8, at 2302 ("[M]odified universalism permits the court to view
the default and its resolution (liquidation or reorganization) from a worldwide
perspective and to cooperate with other courts to produce results as close to those
that would arise from a single proceeding as local law will permit."). See also
Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor
LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKu. L.J. 105, 112 ("Modified universalism shares the view
that there should be a single main case for an international business in its home
country, governed for the most part by the laws of the home country. However,
modified universalism recognizes that the main case may need support through
secondary or ancillary cases in other countries where assets are located or local
court support is otherwise needed. A local court, under this view, normally ap-
plies domestic law to its proceedings, and it retains the discretion to evaluate the
fairness of home country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors
where appropriate.").
27. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) (noting that
the choice of law and choice of forum questions are analytically separate, but that
the proper functioning of modified universalism requires one set of bankruptcy
laws to apply to the bulk of the case). But see Edward J. Janger, Universal
Proceduralism, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 819, 838-39 (2006-07) (arguing that
these two questions need to remain unbundled and that courts can and should
apply different bankruptcy laws to the separate issues involved in a multina-
tional insolvency. He argues that the impact of forum shopping could be reduced
by harmonizing choice of law rules in such cases stating: "Where choice of law
principles are harmonized, choice of forum does not alter the substantive law that
applies to a case.").
[Vol. 88:317
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International forum shopping is possible under both territorialism
and universalism. In a territorialist system, companies can move
their assets before filing for bankruptcy in order to choose which coun-
try's laws will apply to those assets.28 These eve-of-bankruptcy trans-
fers would be limited only by the practicability of transferring the
assets-a process that would be much easier in a case like National
Warranty's in which the company's assets were mostly liquid. In a
universalist system forum shopping is possible due to the difficulties
inherent in determining which country's bankruptcy courts should be
considered the "main" proceeding, and therefore, which country's
bankruptcy laws will apply to the debtor's worldwide estate. 2 9
This ability to forum shop effectively gives debtors the ability to
choose their preferred bankruptcy laws. Whether by moving their as-
sets under territorialism or strategically taking advantage of modified
universalism's choice of forum rules, debtors can have their chosen
bankruptcy law displace the laws of other countries. These laws not
only involve the procedures for the distribution of assets, but they also
reflect deeper social values and policy choices.30 Thus, forum shop-
ping has both economic and political consequences. Economically, fo-
rum shopping threatens to frustrate the expectations of creditors by
changing the laws governing default.31 Some creditors will be able to
accommodate this risk by adjusting their lending terms, thereby pro-
tecting their own interests, but perhaps raising the overall cost of
lending.32 Politically, forum shopping makes it possible to circumvent
protections for other creditors-especially those that will not be able
to protect themselves, which include groups such as employees, judg-
28. John A.E. Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational
Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 785, 797 (2006-07) ("To 'shop' for favorable
bankruptcy law, a decisionmaker would have to shift (or establish) the debtor's
COMI under universalism into (or in) the jurisdiction-the self-styled haven-
with the attractive law. By contrast, under territorialism, the debtor would need
to move (or situate) the assets into (or in) the favored jurisdiction.").
29. Id.
30. See John A.E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "Local Interests," 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899,
1902 (2005-06). See also Chung, supra note 22, at 270 (arguing bankruptcy laws
embody and reflect each society's particular choices concerning its attitudes to-
ward money, debt, the relationship between those with property and those with-
out, employers and labor).
31. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (discussing
how forum shopping would frustrate creditors' expectations, particularly those of
weaker creditor groups).
32. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2181 (1999-2000) ("From the perspective of the debtor, how-
ever, the choice of regime is important even if all creditors adjust, because a re-
duction in the costs imposed by the bankruptcy system will reduce the overall
cost of lending-leading to a reduction in the cost of capital for debtors.").
2009]
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ment creditors, tort victims, and trade creditors.33 Any benefits ac-
crued by forum shopping would likely be at the expense of these
groups. 3 4
When the forum shop is into a haven jurisdiction, the consequences
of forum shopping may be even greater. Haven jurisdictions have an
incentive to protect lenders, but they have little incentive to protect
employees, trade creditors, tort victims, and judgment creditors. Pro-
tecting lenders helps make haven-registered companies attractive to
investors. But because haven-registered companies have no local em-
ployees, do not have contact with local businesses, and generally have
no presence in the haven aside from their corporate books, their
lawmakers have little incentive to protect these groups. 35 This makes
haven bankruptcy courts particularly attractive to debtors and their
lenders. It also makes forum shopping into haven jurisdictions partic-
ularly problematic politically, as the haven bankruptcy law would
then apply to employees and others worldwide.
B. American Perspective on Forum Shopping
From an American perspective, forum shopping can be divided into
two categories-inbound and outbound. 3 6 Outbound forum shopping
involves American-based companies filing for bankruptcy in foreign
jurisdictions, as occurred in the National Warranty bankruptcy dis-
cussed above. Inbound forum shopping involves a foreign company fil-
ing for bankruptcy in the United States. A notorious example was In
re Yukos Oil in which the Russian oil giant filed for bankruptcy in
Houston, Texas, based on the mere presence of bank account there.3 7
33. Id.
34. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 102-03 ("The losers will be the corporate outsiders
who have no means of controlling their debtor's choice of courts: tort victims, em-
ployees, suppliers, customers, other stakeholders with small interests, and-as
with every strategy game-the less sophisticated players.").
35. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1019, 1031 (2007) ("One great source of abuse with havens, of course, is
that they regulate conduct that has no effect on the regulating jurisdiction or its
citizens, so they are free to accept results that no polity would be likely to permit
as applies to its own citizens or its own economy.").
36. See Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New
One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bank-
ruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577 (2006-07) (using "outbound" and "inbound" to
discuss the chartering of companies).
37. In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 407 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The court finds
that the funds deposited by Misamore in the Southwest Bank of Texas account
prepetition (approximately $480,000) are property of Yukos. The court concludes
that Yukos has standing to be a debtor under Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction with respect to
the instant case."). Even though the presence of property made Yukos an eligible
debtor, the court dismissed the case on other grounds. Id. at 411.
324
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These categories have a definitional problem in that they rely on
being able to identify a company as American-based or foreign-based.
Debtors like National Warranty and Yukos Oil easily fit into these
definitions. However, other debtors challenge these designations.
Perhaps the most famous cross-border insolvency case involved Max-
well Publications, which had significant assets, operations, and credi-
tors in both England and the United States. 38 When Maxwell filed for
bankruptcy in both countries, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court struggled to
determine whether the "Englishness" of the company suggested that
English bankruptcy law should apply to the debtor's prepetition trans-
actions. 39 As the factual inquiry of the case shows, the definitional
underpinnings of "inbound" and "outbound" forum shopping are fuzzy
at the margins.
Despite the difficulty of defining the margins of these categories,
dividing forum shopping into these two categories is analytically use-
ful because different aspects of the Bankruptcy Code make each type
of shopping possible. 40 Inbound forum shopping is possible because of
the generous venue requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, as dis-
cussed above in reference to In re Yukos. Outbound forum shopping is
made possible by Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (and formerly by
its predecessor Section 304), which is discussed in the following
section.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCIES
Since its enactment in 1978, the United States Bankruptcy Code
has endorsed a universalist-type treatment of cross-border insolven-
cies by encouraging cooperation with foreign bankruptcy courts. As
originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Code's Section 304 provided a pro-
cedure for foreign debtors to seek cooperation with U.S. bankruptcy
courts. Congress then replaced Section 304 with Chapter 15 in 2005,
as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
38. For an excellent summary of this fascinating case, see John A.E. Pottow, The
Maxwell Case, in BANKRupTcy LAW STORIES 222-37 (Robert Rasmusen ed., 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1000448.
39. See In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 817 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d. Cir. 1996) (using the
term "Englishness"). See also In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 170 B.R. at 817-18
(discussing the English connections justifying the application of English laws).
40. For example, the laws governing granting comity to foreign proceedings make
outbound forum shopping possible, found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1517, 1519, 1520, &
1521 (2006), while inbound shopping is made possible by the broad definition of
who is an eligible "debtor," found in 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
20091
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Act.41 Chapter 15 represents the nearly wholesale incorporation into
the Bankruptcy Code of the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvencies
("Model Law"), promulgated by the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law. 42
Chapter 15 is similar to Section 304 in terms of the procedural
structure for seeking cooperation with a U.S. bankruptcy court. When
a foreign company files for bankruptcy abroad, it can then file a peti-
tion in a U.S. bankruptcy court requesting comity. Instead of having
to open a plenary bankruptcy to protect its U.S.-based assets under
either Chapter 7 or 11, the debtor or its foreign representative 4 3 can
file an ancillary petition requesting the court to cooperate with the
foreign proceeding.44 This ancillary proceeding is designed to be less
costly and time-consuming than a full bankruptcy proceeding. If the
court determines cooperation is appropriate, then it may take certain
actions such as granting certain protections to the debtor's U.S.-based
assets, assisting the foreign representative in collecting U.S. assets, or
turning the assets over to the foreign court for distribution.4 5
Chapter 15 is also similar to Section 304 in that they both contain
territorialist elements-what might be termed "territorialist over-
rides."4 6 While both systems encourage international cooperation,
they contain provisions that override this commitment to cooperation
and allow the U.S. court to refuse to defer to the foreign proceeding.
Chapter 15's territorialist override is found in its public policy excep-
tion, which allows the court to refuse to cooperate with any foreign
proceeding if cooperation would result in consequences that violate
41. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 11 of the
United States Code).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006) ("The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency . . ").
43. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(24) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) ("The term 'foreign representa-
tive' means a person or body, including a person or body appointed on an interim
basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the
liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such
foreign proceeding.").
44. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, supra note 8, at 2300
("An ancillary proceeding is designed primarily to aid the 'main' proceeding in the
debtor's home country. It does not contemplate a full administration and distri-
bution of the debtor's local assets. Instead, as discussed infra, the court in the
ancillary proceeding might issue injunctions against creditor lawsuits and
seizures and provide a foreign administrator with assistance in gaining informa-
tion about local assets.").
45. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1519-1521 (2006) for relief available upon recognition under
Chapter 15.
46. See Edward S. Adams and Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy:
How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 43 (2008) (discuss-
ing how the Model Law has universalist and territorialist elements).
[Vol. 88:317
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fundamental U.S. policies.47 While some have argued that this public
policy exception could potentially swallow the rule, the debate con-
cerning Chapter 15 has mainly focused on its "COMI" standard.4s
Chapter 15's main difference from Section 304 is that it makes co-
operation with the foreign proceeding mandatory if the debtor has its
COMI in the foreign jurisdiction. Section 304 made cooperation dis-
cretionary and provided courts with a series of considerations to deter-
mine when comity was appropriate. 49 This discretionary system had
been criticized for producing inconsistent results and for being both
over- and under-cooperative.5O One of Section 304's guidelines that
contributed to these inconsistent results was the requirement that the
distribution of proceedings in the foreign bankruptcy be "substantially
in accordance" with what the creditors would receive in a U.S. bank-
ruptcy.5 1 This factor, in essence, applied a "no harm, no foul" ap-
proach: if the local U.S. creditors' recovery in the foreign proceeding
did not substantially differ from what they would have received in a
U.S. proceeding, then the court could grant comity to that proceeding.
Courts and commentators differed, however, on what it meant for the
foreign proceeding to differ substantially from U.S. law.52 Some inter-
preted this as requiring there to be no difference in outcomes. 5 3
Others argued that the standard should be more tolerant of outcome
differences. 5 4
Chapter 15 replaced these discretionary standards with a rule
mandating cooperation if the foreign proceeding is filed where the
debtor has its COMI.55 Cooperation remains discretionary if the for-
eign proceeding is not in the debtor's COMI, but rather in a jurisdic-
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refus-
ing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly
contrary to the public policy of the United States.").
48. Chung, supra note 22, at 260-61 ("As with the old § 304, the new Chapter 15 will
likely generate debate regarding the extent to which it promotes or achieves the
goals of universalism. The battleground for this debate will likely be § 1506, the
public policy exception.").
49. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (2006).
52. See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Cri-
tique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
135, 171-72 (1992) ("In enacting § 304, Congress demonstrated 'a desire for
greater international cooperation in transnational insolvencies.' Nevertheless,
judicial reaction has been mixed-the courts have interpreted § 304 inconsis-
tently and have sometimes failed to follow the legislative intent that produced
it.").
53. See Westbrook, supra note 27, at 472 (arguing for a liberal interpretation of"sub-
stantially in accordance").
54. See Lopucki, supra note 12, at 84 (criticizing the liberal interpretation of "sub-
stantially in accordance").
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (2006).
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tion where the debtor has an "establishment"-defined as a place
where the debtor carries on nontransitory economic activity.56 In-
stead of looking for outcome differences between the foreign bank-
ruptcy law and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 15's approach
examines the debtor's contacts with the foreign jurisdiction.
It has been argued this move away from Section 304's discretion-
ary standards would have several benefits. According to Professor Jay
Westbrook, one of the drafters of the Model Law, it would produce
more consistent results by making cooperation mandatory;5 7 it would
be more tolerant of outcome differences overall; 58 and it would restrict
outbound forum shopping.59
Professor Westbrook further predicted that Chapter 15's COMI
standard would deny cooperation to bankruptcy cases in offshore
havens. 60 As a result, National Warranty-type debtors would be una-
ble to receive the protections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code if they
chose to file for bankruptcy in a haven jurisdiction.61
Others have argued that Chapter 15's COMI rule would be incapa-
ble of providing any of these benefits.6 2 They have argued that any
universalist system is bound to create unpredictability and promote
forum shopping-and that the COMI rule is simply too malleable to
act as an effective check on forum shopping. 63 Professor Lynn
LoPucki has led the argument against universalism in general and
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2) (2006).
57. Westbrook, supra note 35, at 1024 ("A central point of the Model Law was meant
to be adoption of a structure less amorphous than comity.").
58. Westbrook, supra note 27, at 473 ("Section 304(c) demonstrates that Congress
has utterly failed to come to grips with the problem of outcome differences.").
59. Westbrook, supra notes 10 & 11 (arguing that the COMI rule would put an end to
haven proceedings). See also Pottow, supra note 28 (arguing that the COMI stan-
dard provides a robust rule to prevent forum shopping).
60. See Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, supra note 8, at 2317
("A naked incorporation in a sun-drenched bank haven would fall easily before
proof of the actual center of the business, while a multiply-centered business in-
corporated under the law of any of its centers would be easily 'centered' for bank-
ruptcy purposes.").
61. See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 8, at 728 ("[T]he COMI of a com-
pany like National Warranty would be clearly located in Nebraska and thus the
Caymans liquidation could not be its main proceeding.").
62. See Chung, supra note 12, at 125; Chung, supra note 22, at 301 (arguing that
Chapter 15's COMI standard reflects a naivete about the financial incentives to
forum shop); LoPucki, supra note 13, at 760 ("Courts too easily manipulate vague
standards such as the 'center of its interests' or the 'center of gravity' when the
future of local businesses, the priorities of local creditors, and millions of dollars
in professional fees hang in the balance."); Frederick Tung, Is International
Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (2001) (applying game theory and
analogizing the decision to cooperate as a sort of prisoner's dilemma, arguing that
that COMI standard will allow countries to "defect").
63. See LoPucki, supra note 13, at 760.
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Chapter 15 in particular.6 4 The thrust of his argument against modi-
fied universalism is that it gives debtors the ability to forum shop for
their preferred bankruptcy laws, and then, through ancillary proceed-
ings, to have that chosen bankruptcy law apply worldwide. 6 5
Professor LoPucki's specific argument against Chapter 15 focuses
on the effectiveness of the COMI standard. 6 6 He has argued that to
the extent that a legal rule could restrict debtors from forum shop-
ping, the rule would have to be a clear rule that is not subject to ma-
nipulation.67 A strict interpretation of Section 304 might qualify as
such a rule: no cooperation unless the outcome of the bankruptcy
would be identical under the foreign law and the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.68 He has argued that the COMI rule, in contrast, is too vague to
be effective. 69 Although this new rule has been hailed as being more
objective and predictable, he argues that it is too discretionary be-
cause it is impossible to determine the COMI of a multinational com-
pany.70 He points out, first, that the statute does not define COMI,
instead providing only a rebuttable presumption that a debtor's COMI
is where it is incorporated. 7 1 Second, he argues that it would be im-
possible to actually define COMI, as a company may have most of its
assets in one country, its headquarters in another, and be incorpo-
64. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 79-80 ("Under the banner of 'universalism,' the
professionals seek to give a single court effective worldwide jurisdiction over each
multinational company's bankruptcy case. Alone, that would be an improvement
in the system. But to put a single court in control of a case requires some method
for selecting that court. So far the universalists have proposed no method that is
likely to work. If they are allowed to implement their current proposal, it will
trigger an international bankruptcy court competition far more destructive than
the domestic competition in the United States.").
65. Id. at 89-90 ("All the case placer need do to forum shop in a universalist system is
make a plausible argument that the chosen court is at the 'centre of [the debtor's]
main interests.' . . . The plausible argument can be based on the presence in the
chosen country of any of these four attributes: (1) incorporation (registered office),
(2) headquarters, (3) administrative employees and operations, and (4) assets.
Each of these attributes has, at various times and places, been considered the
most appropriate basis on which to fix the location of a multinational company.").
66. Id. at 81 ("In thinking that the home country standard will be sufficient to control
international forum shopping, the universalists have underestimated the incen-
tives for such shopping, the strategic nature of international bankruptcy practice,
and the pressures on courts and countries to each win at least a share of the
world's multibillion-dollar bankruptcy industry for themselves.").
67. LoPucki, supra note 13, at 760.
68. See e.g., LoPucki, supra note 12, at 84 ("Read literally, § 304 clearly limits au-
thority to surrender U.S. assets to situations in which the foreign court will dis-
tribute them in substantially the same way a U.S. court would. But the
universalists, many of whom were themselves bankruptcy judges, chose not to
read § 304 as written.").
69. LoPucki, supra note 13, at 760.
70. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 89-90.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2006).
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rated in yet another.7 2 And third, he fears that even if the courts or
legislature were to adopt a definition, debtors would likely be able to
adapt their corporate structure to manipulate this definition. 73
LoPucki has argued that this inability to locate a country's true
COMI threatens to result in either over- or under-cooperation.74
Over-cooperation may result as debtors will be able to make a plausi-
ble claim that their COMI is in the country of their choosing, and
courts will have no means to refute their claims. 75 Under-cooperation
may result from bankruptcy courts competing with one another to be
the "main" proceeding. That is, courts will be biased towards finding
their own jurisdiction to be the debtors' COMI and, therefore, will
bend the COMI standard to effect this outcome.7 6 Courts may seek to
hold on to cases involving local creditors, or courts may actively seek
to attract the large multinational bankruptcies in order to capture
their high legal fees.77 Although there is an inherent tension in these
predictions 7S-one points to feared outcome of too much cooperation
and the other to not enough-the bottom line is LoPucki believes a
discretionary standard is incapable of producing results that are just
right.
Professor Pottow has countered these criticisms of the COMI stan-
dard by asserting that the standard is sufficiently defined to allow
courts to make a determination while sufficiently vague as to prevent
debtors from manipulating it.79 His insight is that predictability is a
72. LoPucki, supra note 7, at 2226-27.
73. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 98 ("However universalists define a multinational's
home country, the multinational can change it."). For a discussion of how this
phenomenon has occurred in Europe, see Adam Gallagher and Riaz K. Janjuah,
European Insolvency Regulation: German Court Blesses Change of COMI to Bol-
ster Cross-border Group Restructurings, 25 A.B.I. JOURNAL 30 (Sept. 2008) (citing
Schefenacker and Deutsche Nickel cases as examples of German holding compa-
nies that migrated to the United Kingdom in order to use a company voluntary
arrangement in order to restructure).
74. See Pottow, supra note 28 (discussing the inherent tension between these
predictions).
75. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 89-90 (describing how a debtor might plausibly claim
its COMI to be in more than one country).
76. LoPucki, supra note 7, at 2236-37 ("The benefit to the forum nation will be in the
economic activity [international forum shopping] brings to that nation ...
Havens such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda will be driven by competition
to adopt laws that seek to systemically exploit involuntary and insufficiently ad-
justing creditors, customers, and other stakeholders."). See also Pottow, supra
note 28, at 1918-19 (discussing the "pride" of courts in wanting to apply their
own bankruptcy rules).
77. LoPucki, supra note 13, at 760.
78. See Pottow, supra note 28.
79. Id. at 790 ("This relationship between predictability and forum shopping means
that earlier territorialist criticism of the imperfections of universalism's choice of
law rules may actually, and perhaps ironically, be praise for a certain flexibility
that may inhibit forum shopping.").
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prerequisite to forum shopping; therefore, bright line rules are most
vulnerable to forum shopping.8 0 He argues that, because the COMI
standard is not a bright line rule, instead relying on some judicial dis-
cretion, courts will be able to apply Chapter 15 in order to prevent
forum shopping.8 1
This debate regarding Chapter 15 has also played out in front of
courts interpreting the COMI standard. This Article summarizes
three important cases interpreting Chapter 15's COMI standard.
These three cases all involve companies that were incorporated in off-
shore jurisdictions, did business in the United States, filed for bank-
ruptcy in those offshore jurisdictions, and then filed Chapter 15
petitions seeking recognition of their foreign proceedings.
IV. CASES
A. Tri-Continental
The first such case was In re Tri-Continental Exchange, Ltd.s2 in
the Eastern District of California. The debtors were a group of off-
shore insurance companies that sold fraudulent insurance policies in
the United States before filing for bankruptcy in the Caribbean is-
lands of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.8 3 They then sought foreign
main recognition in the United States by filing a Chapter 15 petition
in the Eastern District of California.8 4
American judgment creditors opposed this petition as it would en-
join their efforts to collect on their judgments.8 5 They argued that the
debtors' COMI was actually in the United States because this is where
the fraud took place.8 6 However, the court overruled these objections,
finding that the debtor's COMI was really in the Caribbean.8 7 The
court found the COMI determination to be the equivalent of determin-
ing a company's "principal place of business" in United States law.8 8
Since the debtors were registered in St. Vincent and "conducted regu-
lar business operations" there, this was sufficient to establish their
COMI as being in St. Vincent. It therefore granted foreign main rec-
ognition to those proceedings.8 9
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
83. Id. at 629.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 631.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 640.
88. Id. at 634.




The second major case involved a group of hedge funds that filed a
Chapter 15 petition in New York seeking foreign main recognition for
their Cayman Islands liquidation. 90 The funds were placed into bank-
ruptcy twice in the Cayman Islands, with Chapter 15 petitions filed in
New York both times.
The first time, the shareholders placed the funds into bankruptcy
in an effort to enjoin the enforcement of a settlement agreement in a
related bankruptcy case, In re Refco.91 That settlement agreement
pertained to an avoidance action brought by Refco's trustee to recover
approximately $312 million that the company had paid to the funds in
the ninety days prior to bankruptcy. 9 2 A group of shareholders who
disapproved of the settlement placed the funds into liquidation in the
Caymans and then filed a Chapter 15 petition, seeking foreign main
recognition which, they argued, would enjoin the settlement agree-
ment.9 3 Judge Drain, presiding over both Refco and the Chapter 15
petition, declared that even a successful Chapter 15 petition would not
enjoin the settlement agreement. 94 Shortly thereafter, the SPhinX
representatives withdrew their Chapter 15 petition and the Caymans
liquidation was put on hold.95
A month later the funds were again placed into winding up pro-
ceedings, this time by the directors. 96 The funds' representative sub-
sequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining
the appellate litigation concerning the settlement agreement.9 7 Chief
Bankruptcy Judge Bernstein denied this motion, describing the mo-
tion as an "end run" around the Refco bankruptcy court's order and
the district court's scheduling order in the appellate litigation. 98 The
trustee and committee of unsecured creditors in Refco filed a motion
characterizing the Chapter 15 petition as a "last-ditch effort" to frus-
trate the Refco settlement.9 9 They argued that the Caymans proceed-
90. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, 371 B.R. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
91. No. 05-60006, 2006 WL 3409088 (S.D.N.Y. November 16, 2006), aftd, 505 F.3d
109 (2nd Cir. 2007).
92. Id.
93. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. at 109.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 110.
96. Id. at 111.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Amended Joint Opposition of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Refco
Inc., et al., and Marc S. Kirschner, Chapter 11 Trustee for Refco Capital Markets
Ltd., to the Verified Petition of Kenneth M. Krys and Christopher Strike, as For-
eign Representatives, for Recognition of Foreign Main Proceedings under 11
U.S.C. §§ 1515 and 1516 and Relief Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520 and 1521 at 2, In re
SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 06-11760).
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ings did not qualify as foreign main recognition because the funds
were a "textbook example of a 'letterbox company."'1 0 0
The bankruptcy court agreed with this characterization of the
Chapter 15 petition and said that, but for the petition's improper pur-
pose, the court would have granted foreign main recognition.Ir' Even
though the court noted facts refuting the debtors' assertion that their
COMI was in the Caymans-as "exempted companies" the funds were
actually prohibited from engaging in business activity in the Caymans
by Cayman law,10 2 the only assets in the Cayman Islands were its
corporate books,103 the operations were conducted by a Delaware cor-
poration,1O4 none of the funds' directors lived in the Caymans,10 5 and
no board meetings were ever held there iO6-the court placed greater
weight on Chapter 15's purpose of promoting comity.107 It held apply-
ing the recognition requirements strictly would subvert Chapter 15's
purpose of promoting cooperation.1 0 8
The court determined that the foreign proceedings should be recog-
nized in some capacity, as main or nonmain.1 0 9 The liquidation pro-
ceedings in the Caymans were already underway, such Cayman
Islands liquidations had been considered appropriate under the Sec-
tion 304 caselaw, and the foreign representatives had filed the proper
paperwork. 1 10 Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the court
indicated that the creditors consented to having the liquidation occur
in the Cayman Islands."' Not even the objecting Refco creditors had
questioned the ability of the Caymans court to do a proper job-their
only complaint was that the Caymans proceeding should not impact
the Refco bankruptcy. The court saw this consent from the parties as
essential, stating that "the interests of the debtor's estate, creditors
and other parties, absent evidence that they support a 'primary' pro-
ceeding for an improper purpose, should generally be a significant and
perhaps deciding factor."112
100. Id. at 8.
101. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. at 121.
102. Id. at 107 n.2.
103. Id. at 107.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 108.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 112.
108. Id. at 117 ("As discussed above, the flexibility inherent in chapter 15 strongly
suggests, however, that the Court should not apply such factors mechanically.
Instead, they should be viewed in light of chapter 15's emphasis on protecting the
reasonable interests of parties in interest pursuant to fair procedures and the
maximization of the debtor's value.").
109. Id. at 115.
110. Id. at 116.
111. Id. at 120-21.
112. Id. at 114.
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The SPhinX liquidators appealed this decision to the district
court 1 3 where Judge Sweet upheld the decision. He found that the
bankruptcy court properly applied Chapter 15's flexibility: "Overall, it
was appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to consider the factors it
considered, to retain its flexibility, and to reach a pragmatic resolution
supported by the facts found. No authority has been cited to the
contrary."114
C. Bear Stearns
The Bear Stearns case contained facts very similar to the SPhinX
case-the debtors were New York hedge funds incorporated in the
Cayman Islands as exempted companies. 115 Also like SPhinX, the
funds were placed into liquidation in the Cayman Islands and the liq-
uidators then filed a Chapter 15 petition in New York seeking foreign
main recognition. However, the court's analysis differed greatly from
the SPhinX decision. Even though the debtors in Bear Stearns were
not trying to enjoin any ongoing U.S. proceedings and there were no
objecting parties, 1 16 the court did not place any weight on the credi-
tors' consent or the debtor's purpose in filing for bankruptcy. In fact,
the court specifically noted its departure from the SPhinX decision in
this regard: "To the extent that non objection would make the recogni-
tion process a rubber stamp exercise, this Court disagrees with the
dicta in the SPhinX decision.""17
Instead of focusing on the presence of objections, the court followed
the Tri-Continental decision in examining the debtors' contacts with
the Cayman Islands. Even though the funds were registered in the
Caymans, the court listed several factors rebutting the COMI pre-
sumption, including:
there are no employees or managers in the Cayman Islands, the investment
manager for the Funds is located in New York, the Administrator that runs
the back-office operations of the Funds is in the United States along with the
Funds' books and records and prior to the commencement of the Foreign Pro-
ceeding, all of the Funds' liquid assets were located in United States.1 1 8
This evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption and to actually
establish the COMI within the United States. 1 19 This made the for-
113. Krys v. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re SPhinX, Ltd.), 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
2007), affg In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
114. Id. at 19.
115. In re Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Inc.,
374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
116. Id. at 129.
117. Id. at 130.
118. Id.
119. Id. ("As noted, each of the Funds' real seat and therefore their COMI is the
United States, the place where the Funds conduct the administration of their
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties . . .
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eign proceedings ineligible for foreign main recognition.120 In addi-
tion, the evidence indicated that the debtors lacked an
"establishment" in the Cayman Islands in order to qualify for foreign
nonmain recognition.121 Consequently, the court denied recognition
altogether to the Cayman Islands liquidation.122
The case was appealed, and again went to Judge Sweet.123
Whereas the SPhinX appeal only raised the issue of the denial of for-
eign main recognition-the bankruptcy court's order granting
nonmain recognition was not appealed-the Bear Stearns appeal
raised the issues of both foreign main and nonmain recognition.124
Reviewing the facts on a "clearly erroneous" standard, the district
court upheld the findings that the funds had neither their COMI nor
an "establishment" in the Caymans. 125
V. METHODOLOGY
The data for this Article includes all Chapter 15 filings under the
law's first three years, as well as all the Section 304 filings in the
three years preceding the change in law.126 The data includes only
business cases. And when there were administratively consolidated
petitions, they include only the lead cases.
For each case, the location of the foreign proceeding was deter-
mined from the debtor's petition. Each case was also coded for the
presence of objecting parties, 12 7 objections to the COMI determina-
tion, and objections based on the public policy exception to recogni-
tion.128 Information regarding the debtors, including their "home," 12 9
and, more specifically, is located in this district where principal interests, assets
and management are located.").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 131.
122. Id. at 132.
123. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Inc.,
389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), affg 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
124. Id. at 327.
125. Id. at 338-39.
126. This includes Section 304 petitions filed between October 17, 2002 and October
17, 2005 when Chapter 15 took effect. It also includes Chapter 15 filings between
October 17, 2005 to October 17, 2008. Petitions were found by running reports by
district on PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records, www.pacer.gov).
For 14 districts it was not possible to run reports for Section 304 filings. For
those districts, I contacted the court clerks who either sent me the docket num-
bers or else told me there had been no Section 304 filings. Only two districts did
not respond. For two other districts, Southern District of Florida and Eastern
District of Michigan, the Section 304 dockets were available but the underlying
filings were not.
127. Objecting party was coded as "yes" if there was any form of objection made, in-
cluding limited objections and any sort of response from a creditor.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
129. "Home" included where the debtor listed its company as based.
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industry, 130 and date of incorporation were taken from their petitions.
If the debtor's country of incorporation was in an offshore haven,131
they were coded as haven countries.
VI. FINDINGS
An analysis of the ancillary petitions filed in the last three years
under Section 304 and first three years under Chapter 15 shows that
the new law has resulted in a decrease in forum shopping into haven
jurisdictions. There is no evidence that debtors moved into haven ju-
risdictions in order to manipulate Chapter 15's COMI test. And while
Chapter 15 did not result in an immediate decrease in filings from
haven countries, there has been a significant drop off in filings since
the Bear Stearns decision in August of 2007. Thus, Chapter 15 has
indeed restricted outbound forum shopping into haven districts, but it
took nearly two years of caselaw development before it had this
impact.
A. Re-Incorporation as Bankruptcy Planning
The enactment itself of Chapter 15 did not significantly alter the
ancillary bankruptcy practice. The number of ancillary petitions filed
in the first three years under the new law was almost exactly the
same as under Section 304. And just as under Section 304, the Chap-
ter 15 ancillary petitions sought comity for foreign proceedings princi-
pally from the United Kingdom and Canada, with the Cayman Islands
as the third most common jurisdiction accounting for roughly 10% of
all petitions. And filings from haven jurisdictions overall comprised
about 20% of all the ancillary petitions. 13 2 This 20% involved fourteen
petitions seeking cooperation under Chapter 15.
Nothing in the court records indicates that any of these companies
actually re-incorporated into the havens on the eve of bankruptcy. Ad-
ditionally, according to the debtors' ancillary petitions, only three of
these fourteen companies had registered in the havens within three
years of filing for bankruptcy. It is highly unlikely that the other
eleven companies' registration would have been part of a bankruptcy
planning strategy. Of the three that did register in the havens within
three years of filing, two were hedge funds that ran into trouble with
130. "Industry" was coded as one of the following author-created categories: bank,
holding company, insurance, investment, manufacturing, telecommunications,
energy, software, airline, construction, or other. These categories were my own
categories and are not formal industry codes. Information regarding the industry
was based on the debtors' petitions.
131. The following countries were coded as offshore havens: Bahamas, Barbados, Ber-
muda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Isle of Man,
Jersey, Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
132. See Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF SECTION 304 AND CHAPTER 15
FILINGS IN THE UK, CANADA, AND CAYMAN ISLANDS
DURING THREE YEARS PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT TO
CHANGE IN LAW








the subprime mortgage crisis. 133 The third was an insurance com-
pany that was forced to close for failure to meet regulatory require-
ments. 13 4 With these three companies, there is no evidence that they
moved into a tax haven in order to file for bankruptcy. In fact, it ap-
pears that they were, like most haven-registered companies, financial
institutions that were attracted to the havens for tax or regulatory
purposes, not for the bankruptcy laws.
B. Number of Haven Petitions
As noted above, the number of ancillary petitions emanating from
haven proceedings did not change immediately upon the enactment of
Chapter 15. Nor did the new law affect the treatment of these initial
haven petitions. Petitions from havens and non-havens were rou-
tinely granted. The Tri-Continental decision, which first interpreted
the COMI standard, did not impact haven filings even though it ap-
plied a strict reading of the statute. It was not until the Bear Stearns
opinion that a court denied an ancillary petition. Since that court is-
sued its order denying recognition to the Cayman Islands insolvency
133. These two were In re Basis Yield Alpha (Master), 381 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2008) and In re Bear Steams High-Grade Credit Strategies Master Fund, Inc.,
374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
134. In re Hatteras Reinsurance Ltd., No. 06-11304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed June 8,
2006), available at https://ecf.nysb.uscourts.gov/.
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proceedings, there has been only one other haven petition filed.135
And that case was not a clear forum shop, as the debtor had a pres-
ence in Bermuda, with the Chief Financial Officer and other key em-
ployees operating out of their local office. 13 6
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF FILINGS FROM
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C. Analysis
From this data, this paper concludes that the Bear Stearns opinion
marked the true effective date of Chapter 15. Chapter 15 had been on
the books for nearly two years, and there had been two previous major
cases decided under Chapter 15. But by denying recognition to the
135. See Figure 2.
136. Verified Petition Under Chapter 15 for Recognition of a Foreign Main Proceeding
and Application for Order to Show Cause With Temporary Restraining Order,
and Preliminary Injunction, In Re John C. McKenna, as Liquidator of BluePoint
Re Limited, No. 08-13169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed August 13, 2008), available at
https://ecf.nysb.uscourts.gov/. According to the petition, the debtor insurance
company had extensive assets in the United States but its Chief Financial Officer
and other key employees operated out of Bermuda. The company was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Wachovia Corporation. It "principally reinsured financial
guarantees of public finance and asset-back debt obligations insured by monoline




Caymans proceeding, Bear Stearns has thus far had the results Pro-
fessor Westbrook predicted Chapter 15 would bring about.137 Even
though the decision in that case has been controversial, its holding
has made a significant impact on ancillary bankruptcy practice.
It is important to note that this data covers only the first three
years under Chapter 15. And just as it took courts some time to adjust
to the new law, it may also take debtors some time to adjust their
practices. As the critics of Chapter 15, and universalism in general,
correctly point out, debtors have a very strong incentive to forum shop
their cases. And it is possible that the coming years will reveal new
tactics that will allow debtors to forum shop into their preferred ve-
nues. For one thing, it is possible that it is too early, from the data
reported here, to detect re-incorporations into havens in order to sat-
isfy the COMI test. It is also possible that debtors may be able to
receive cooperation by seeking "nonmain" recognition. Hedge funds
like Bear Stearns and SPhinX may adjust their practices-indeed, the
haven jurisdictions may assist them in so doing13 8-in order to satisfy
the "establishment" definition for nonmain recognition.
Furthermore, it is possible that haven-registered debtors have
found a way to still conduct their bankruptcies in haven countries
without needing to file an ancillary petition. Perhaps haven-regis-
tered financial institutions have been able to avoid the necessity of
seeking comity in the United States by transferring their assets to the
haven prior to filing bankruptcy-a transfer which may be easy for
companies with highly-liquid assets like National Warranty. All of
the haven-registered companies in this sample were financial institu-
tions of some kind, whose assets are likely more easily transferable
than would be a manufacturing company's. Alternatively, it may be
possible that the financial crisis has made seeking comity in the
United States unnecessary. For offshore hedge funds selling asset-
backed securities, it may not be worth seeking the transfer of such
assets because they have become so difficult to value.
These explanations are certainly plausible and the data cannot re-
fute them, but they do not undermine the impact of Chapter 15. While
137. The fact that the decision was filed in the Southern District of New York also
likely increased the impact of this case as more than 50% of the Chapter 15 peti-
tions were filed in this district. This may also partially explain Tri-Continental's
lack of impact, as it was only one of two petitions filed in the Eastern District of
California. See Pottow, supra note 28, at 812 n.111 ("Perhaps a cynic might ex-
plain Tri-Continental as a consequence of the Eastern District of California being
a sleepy backwater unattuned to (or unable to compete meaningfully in) the
heady world of jurisdictional competition.").
138. See Timothy Brock, The Assault on Offshore Havens in Bear Stearns Undermines
New Chapter 15: Part 11, 27 A.B.I. JOURNAL 24 n.83 (Feb. 2008) ("Bear Stearns
could bring more business to Havens by forcing offshore entities to establish a
greater local presence there.").
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debtors may have found a way to forum shop into haven jurisdictions,
they then cannot benefit from the protection of U.S. bankruptcy law.
This denial of cooperation is the impact of Chapter 15. Chapter 15
determines when comity with a foreign bankruptcy proceeding is ap-
propriate. It does not seek to limit the ability of companies to transfer
assets. And in serving this role as gatekeeper to U.S. bankruptcy law,
Chapter 15 has served its purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
After several years of debate concerning the impact, if any, Chap-
ter 15 would have on cross-border bankruptcies, the study reported in
this Article provides evidence that the change in law has made a ma-
jor impact on outbound forum shopping. Through Chapter 15, courts
have denied the protection of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to companies
that forum shop their bankruptcies into haven jurisdictions. Petitions
seeking comity with haven proceedings-which had accounted for
roughly 20% of all ancillary petitions-have since come to a near halt.
By strictly following Chapter 15's COMI standard and denying recog-
nition to the Cayman Islands liquidation, In re Bear Stearns changed
the practice of ancillary bankruptcies in the United States. While Na-
tional Warranty-type companies are still capable of transferring their
assets to a haven jurisdiction to liquidate, they are no longer able to
then receive the protections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
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